

# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Citation: *Worldspan Marine Inc. (Re)*,  
2011 BCSC 1758

Date: 20111221  
Docket: S113550  
Registry: Vancouver

In the Matter of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

And

In the Matter of the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44  
and the *Business Corporations Act*, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57

And

In the Matter of Worldspan Marine Inc., Crescent Custom Yachts Inc.,  
Queenship Marine Industries Ltd., 27222 Developments Ltd.  
and Composite FRP Products Ltd.

Petitioners

Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Pearlman

## Reasons for Judgment

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Queenship Marine Industries Ltd., 27222  
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Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C.  
December 16, 2011

Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C.  
December 21, 2011

## INTRODUCTION

[1] On December 16, 2011, on the application of the petitioners, I granted an order confirming and extending the Initial Order and stay pronounced June 6, 2011, and subsequently confirmed and extended to December 16, 2011, by a further 119 days to April 13, 2012. When I made the order, I informed counsel that I would provide written Reasons for Judgment. These are my Reasons.

## POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

[2] The petitioners apply for the extension of the Initial Order to April 13, 2012 in order to permit them additional time to work toward a plan of arrangement by continuing the marketing of the Vessel “QE014226C010” (the “Vessel”) with Fraser Yachts, to explore potential Debtor In Possession (“DIP”) financing to complete construction of the Vessel pending a sale, and to resolve priorities among *in rem* claims against the Vessel.

[3] The application of the petitioners for an extension of the Initial Order and stay was either supported, or not opposed, by all of the creditors who have participated in these proceedings, other than the respondent, Harry Sargeant III.

[4] The Monitor supports the extension as the best option available to all of the creditors and stakeholders at this time.

[5] These proceedings had their genesis in a dispute between the petitioner Worldspan Marine Inc. and Mr. Sargeant. On February 29, 2008, Worldspan entered into a Vessel Construction Agreement with Mr. Sargeant for the construction of the Vessel, a 144-foot custom motor yacht. A dispute arose between Worldspan and Mr. Sargeant concerning the cost of construction. In January 2010 Mr. Sargeant ceased making payments to Worldspan under the Vessel Construction Agreement.

[6] The petitioners continued construction until April 2010, by which time the total arrears invoiced to Mr. Sargeant totalled approximately \$4.9 million. In April or May

2010, the petitioners ceased construction of the Vessel and the petitioner Queenship laid off 97 employees who were then working on the Vessel. The petitioners maintain that Mr. Sargeant's failure to pay monies due to them under the Vessel Construction Agreement resulted in their insolvency, and led to their application for relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, ("CCAA") in these proceedings.

[7] Mr. Sargeant contends that the petitioners overcharged him. He claims against the petitioners, and against the as yet unfinished Vessel for the full amount he paid toward its construction, which totals \$20,945,924.05.

[8] Mr. Sargeant submits that the petitioners are unable to establish that circumstances exist that make an order extending the Initial Order appropriate, or that they have acted and continue to act in good faith and with due diligence. He says that the petitioners have no prospect of presenting a viable plan of arrangement to their creditors. Mr. Sargeant also contends that the petitioners have shown a lack of good faith by failing to disclose to the Court that the two principals of Worldspan, Mr. Blane, and Mr. Barnett are engaged in a dispute in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida where Mr. Barnett is suing Mr. Blane for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and conversion respecting monies invested in Worldspan.

[9] Mr. Sargeant drew the Court's attention to Exhibit 22 to the complaint filed in the United States District Court by Mr. Barnett, which is a demand letter dated June 29, 2011 from Mr. Barnett's Florida counsel to Mr. Blane stating:

Your fraudulent actions not only caused monetary damage to Mr. Barnett, but also caused tremendous damage to WorldSpan. More specifically, your taking Mr. Barnett's money for your own use deprived the company of much needed capital. Your harm to WorldSpan is further demonstrated by your conspiracy with the former CEO of WorldSpan, Lee Taubeneck, to overcharge a customer in order to offset the funds you were stealing from Mr. Barnett that should have gone to the company. Your deplorable actions directly caused the demise of what could have been a successful and innovative new company" (underlining added)

[10] Mr. Sargeant says, and I accept, that he is the customer referred to in the demand letter. He submits that the allegations contained in the complaint and demand letter lend credence to his claim that Worldspan breached the Vessel Construction Agreement by engaging in dishonest business practices, and over-billed him. Further, Mr. Sargeant says that the petitioner's failure to disclose this dispute between the principals of Worldspan, in addition to demonstrating a lack of good faith, reveals an internal division that diminishes the prospects of Worldspan continuing in business.

[11] As yet, there has been no judicial determination of the allegations made by Mr. Barnett in his complaint against Mr. Blane.

## **DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS**

[12] On an application for an extension of a stay pursuant to s. 11.02(2) of the *CCAA*, the petitioners must establish that they have met the test set out in s. 11.02(3):

- (a) whether circumstances exist that make the order appropriate; and
- (b) whether the applicant has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence.

[13] In considering whether “circumstances exist that make the order appropriate”, the court must be satisfied that an extension of the Initial Order and stay will further the purposes of the *CCAA*.

[14] In *Century Services Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)*, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379 at para. 70, Deschamps J., for the Court, stated:

... Appropriateness under the *CCAA* is assessed by inquiring whether the order sought advances the policy objectives underlying the *CCAA*. The question is whether the order will usefully further efforts to achieve the remedial purpose of the *CCAA* — avoiding the social and economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company. I would add that appropriateness extends not only to the purpose of the order, but also to the means it employs. Courts should be mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit.

[15] A frequently cited statement of the purpose of the *CCAA* is found in *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384 at p. 3 where the Court of Appeal held:

The purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business. It is available to any company incorporated in Canada with assets or business activities in Canada that is not a bank, a railway company, a telegraph company, an insurance company, a trust company, or a loan company. When a company has recourse to the C.C.A.A. the court is called upon to play a kind of supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure. Obviously time is critical. Equally obviously, if the attempt at compromise or arrangement is to have any prospect of success there must be a means of holding the creditors at bay, hence the powers vested in the court under s. 11.

[16] In *Pacific National Lease Holding Corp. (Re)*, [1992] B.C.J. No. 3070 (S.C.) Brenner J. (as he then was) summarized the applicable principles at para. 26:

- (1) The purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to allow an insolvent company a reasonable period of time to reorganize its affairs and prepare and file a plan for its continued operation subject to the requisite approval of the creditors and the Court.
- (2) The C.C.A.A. is intended to serve not only the company's creditors but also a broad constituency which includes the shareholders and the employees.
- (3) During the stay period the Act is intended to prevent manoeuvres for positioning amongst the creditors of the company.
- (4) The function of the Court during the stay period is to play a supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure.
- (5) The status quo does not mean preservation of the relative pre-debt status of each creditor. Since the companies under C.C.A.A. orders continue to operate and having regard to the broad constituency of interests the Act is intended to serve, preservation of the status quo is not intended to create a rigid freeze of relative pre-stay positions.
- (6) The Court has a broad discretion to apply these principles to the facts of a particular case.

[17] In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.*, 2008 BCCA 327, the Court of Appeal set aside the extension of a stay granted to the

debtor property development company. There, the Court held that the *CCAA* was not intended to accommodate a non-consensual stay of creditors' rights while a debtor company attempted to carry out a restructuring plan that did not involve an arrangement or compromise on which the creditors could vote. At para. 26, Tysoe J.A., for the Court said this:

In my opinion, the ability of the court to grant or continue a stay under s. 11 is not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring", a term with a broad meaning including such things as refinancings, capital injections and asset sales and other downsizing. Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the *CCAA*, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the *CCAA*'s fundamental purpose.

[18] At para. 32, Tysoe J.A. queried whether the court should grant a stay under the *CCAA* to permit a sale, winding up or liquidation without requiring the matter to be voted upon by the creditors if the plan or arrangement intended to be made by the debtor company simply proposed that the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation be distributed to its creditors.

[19] In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd.* at para. 38, the court held:

... What the Debtor Company was endeavouring to accomplish in this case was to freeze the rights of all of its creditors while it undertook its restructuring plan without giving the creditors an opportunity to vote on the plan. The *CCAA* was not intended, in my view, to accommodate a non-consensual stay of creditors' rights while a debtor company attempts to carry out a restructuring plan that does not involve an arrangement or compromise upon which the creditors may vote.

[20] As counsel for the petitioners submitted, *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd.* was decided before the current s. 36 of the *CCAA* came into force. That section permits the court to authorize the sale of a debtor's assets outside the ordinary course of business without a vote by the creditors.

[21] Nonetheless, *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd.* is authority for the proposition that a stay, or an extension of a stay should only be granted in

furtherance of the *CCAA*'s fundamental purpose of facilitating a plan of arrangement between the debtor companies and their creditors.

[22] Other factors to be considered on an application for an extension of a stay include the debtor's progress during the previous stay period toward a restructuring; whether creditors will be prejudiced if the court grants the extension; and the comparative prejudice to the debtor, creditors and other stakeholders in not granting the extension: *Federal Gypsum Co. (Re)*, 2007 NSSC 347, 40 C.B.R. (5th) 80 at paras. 24-29.

[23] The good faith requirement includes observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealings in the *CCAA* proceedings, the absence of intent to defraud, and a duty of honesty to the court and to the stakeholders directly affected by the *CCAA* process: *Re San Francisco Gifts Ltd.*, 2005 ABQB 91 at paras. 14-17.

#### **Whether circumstances exist that make an extension appropriate**

[24] The petitioners seek the extension to April 13, 2012 in order to allow a reasonable period of time to continue their efforts to restructure and to develop a plan of arrangement.

[25] There are particular circumstances which have protracted these proceedings. Those circumstances include the following:

- (a) Initially, Mr. Sargeant expressed an interest in funding the completion of the Vessel as a Crescent brand yacht at Worldspan shipyards. On July 22, 2011, on the application of Mr. Sargeant, the Court appointed an independent Vessel Construction Officer to prepare an analysis of the cost of completing the Vessel to Mr. Sargeant's specifications. The Vessel Construction Officer delivered his completion cost analysis on October 31, 2011.
- (b) The Vessel was arrested in proceedings in the Federal Court of Canada brought by Offshore Interiors Inc., a creditor and a maritime lien claimant. As a result, The Federal Court, while recognizing the jurisdiction of this Court in the *CCAA* proceedings, has exercised its jurisdiction over the vessel. There are proceedings underway in the Federal Court for the

determination of *in rem* claims against the Vessel. Because this Court has jurisdiction in the CCAA proceedings, and the Federal Court exercises its maritime law jurisdiction over the Vessel, there have been applications in both Courts with respect to the marketing of the Vessel.

- (c) The Vessel, which is the principal asset of the petitioner Worldspan, is a partially completed custom built super yacht for which there is a limited market.

[26] All of these factors have extended the time reasonably required for the petitioners to proceed with their restructuring, and to prepare a plan of arrangement.

[27] On September 19, 2011, when this court confirmed and extended the Initial Order to December 16, 2011, it also authorized the petitioners to commence marketing the Vessel unless Mr. Sargeant paid \$4 million into his solicitor's trust account on or before September 29, 2011.

[28] Mr. Sargeant failed to pay the \$4 million into trust with his solicitors, and subsequently made known his intention not to fund the completion of the Vessel by the petitioners.

[29] On October 7, 2011, the Federal Court also made an order authorizing the petitioners to market the Vessel and to retain a leading international yacht broker, Fraser Yachts, to market the Vessel for an initial term of six months, expiring on April 7, 2012. Fraser Yachts has listed the Vessel for sale at \$18.9 million, and is endeavouring to find a buyer. Although its efforts have attracted little interest to date, Fraser Yachts have expressed confidence that they will be able to find a buyer for the Vessel during the prime yacht buying season, which runs from February through July. Fraser Yachts and the Monitor have advised that process may take up to 9 months.

[30] On November 10, 2011, this Court, on the application of the petitioners, made an order authorizing and approving the sale of their shipyard located at 27222 Lougheed Highway, with a leaseback of sufficient space to enable the petitioners to complete the construction of the Vessel, should they find a buyer who wishes to

have the Vessel completed as a Crescent yacht at its current location. The sale and leaseback of the shipyard has now completed.

[31] Both this Court and the Federal Court have made orders regarding the filing of claims by creditors against the petitioners and the filing of *in rem* claims in the Federal Court against the Vessel.

[32] The determination of the *in rem* claims against the Vessel is proceeding in the Federal Court.

[33] After dismissing the *in rem* claims of various creditors, the Federal Court has determined that the creditors having *in rem* claims against the Vessel are:

Sargeant	\$20,945.924.05
Capri Insurance Services	\$ 45,573.63
Cascade Raider	\$ 64,460.02
Arrow Transportation and CCY	\$ 50,000.00
Offshore Interiors Inc.	\$659,011.85
Continental Hardwood Co.	\$ 15,614.99
Paynes Marine Group	\$ 35,833.17
Restaurant Design and Sales LLC	\$254,383.28

[34] The petitioner, Worldspan's, *in rem* claim in the amount of \$6,643,082.59 was dismissed by the Federal Court and is currently subject to an appeal to be heard January 9, 2012.

[35] In addition, Comerica Bank has asserted an *in rem* claim against the Vessel for \$9,429,913.86, representing the amount it advanced toward the construction of the Vessel. Mr. Mohammed Al-Saleh, a judgment creditor of certain companies controlled by Mr. Sargeant has also asserted an *in rem* claim against the Vessel in the amount of \$28,800,000.

[36] The Federal Court will determine the validity of the outstanding *in rem* claims, and the priorities amongst the *in rem* claims against the Vessel.

[37] The petitioners, in addition to seeking a buyer for the Vessel through Fraser Yachts are also currently in discussions with potential DIP lenders for a DIP facility for approximately \$10 million that would be used to complete construction of the Vessel in the shipyard they now lease. Fraser Yachts has estimated that the value of the Vessel, if completed as a Crescent brand yacht at the petitioners' facility would be \$28.5 million. If the petitioners are able to negotiate a DIP facility, resumption of construction of the Vessel would likely assist their marketing efforts, would permit the petitioners to resume operations, to generate cash flow and to re-hire workers. However, the petitioners anticipate that at least 90 days will be required to obtain a DIP facility, to review the cost of completing the Vessel, to assemble workers and trades, and to bring an application for DIP financing in both this Court and the Federal Court.

[38] An extension of the stay will not materially prejudice any of the creditors or other stakeholders. This case is distinguishable from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd.*, where the debtor was using the *CCAA* proceedings to freeze creditors' rights in order to prevent them from realizing against the property. Here, the petitioners are simultaneously pursuing both the marketing of the Vessel and efforts to obtain DIP financing that, if successful, would enable them to complete the construction of the Vessel at their rented facility. While they do so, a court supervised process for the sale of the Vessel is underway.

[39] Mr. Sargeant also relies on *Encore Developments Ltd. (Re)*, 2009 BCSC 13, in support of his submission that the Court should refuse to extend the stay. There, two secure creditors applied successfully to set aside an Initial Order and stay granted *ex parte* to the debtor real estate development company. The debtor had obtained the Initial Order on the basis that it had sufficient equity in its real estate projects to fund the completion of the remaining projects. In reality, the debtor company had no equity in the projects, and at the time of the application the debtor company had no active business that required the protection of a *CCAA* stay. Here, when the petitioners applied for and obtained the Initial Order, they continued to employ a skeleton workforce at their facility. Their principal asset, aside from the

shipyard, was the partially constructed Vessel. All parties recognized that the CCAA proceedings afforded an opportunity for the completion of the Vessel as a custom Crescent brand yacht, which represented the best way of maximizing the return on the Vessel. On the hearing of this application, all of the creditors, other than Mr. Sargeant share the view that the Vessel should be marketed and sold through an orderly process supervised by this Court and the Federal Court.

[40] I share the view of the Monitor that in the particular circumstances of this case the petitioners cannot finalize a restructuring plan until the Vessel is sold and terms are negotiated for completing the Vessel either at Worldspan's rented facility, or elsewhere. In addition, before the creditors will be in a position to vote on a plan, the amounts and priorities of the creditors' claims, including the *in rem* claims against the Vessel, will need to be determined. The process for determining the *in rem* claims and their priorities is currently underway in the Federal Court.

[41] The Monitor has recommended the Court grant the extension sought by the petitioners. The Monitor has raised one concern, which relates to the petitioners' current inability to fund ongoing operating costs, insurance, and professional fees incurred in the continuation of the CCAA proceedings. At this stage, the landlord has deferred rent for the shipyard for six months until May 2012. At present, the petitioners are not conducting any operations which generate cash flow. Since the last come back hearing in September, the petitioners were able to negotiate an arrangement whereby Mr. Sargeant paid for insurance coverage on the Vessel. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Sargeant, Comerica Bank, or some other party will pay the insurance for the Vessel which comes up for renewal in January, 2012.

[42] Since the sale of the shipyard lands and premises, the petitioners have no assets other than the Vessel capable of protecting an Administration Charge. The Monitor has suggested that the petitioners apply to the Federal Court for an Administration Charge against the Vessel. Whether the petitioners do so is of course a matter for them to determine.

[43] The petitioners will need to make arrangements for the continuing payment of their legal fees and the Monitor's fees and disbursements.

[44] The *CCAA* proceedings cannot be extended indefinitely. However, at this stage, a *CCAA* restructuring still offers the best option for all of the stakeholders. Mr. Sargeant wants the stay lifted so that he may apply for the appointment of Receiver and exercise his remedies against the Vessel. Any application by Mr. Sargeant for the appointment of a Receiver would be resisted by the other creditors who want the Vessel to continue to be marketed under the Court supervised process now underway.

[45] There is still the prospect that through the *CCAA* process the Vessel may be completed by the petitioners either as a result of their finding a buyer who wishes to have the Vessel completed at its present location, or by negotiating DIP financing that enables them to resume construction of the Vessel. Both the marine surveyor engaged by Comerica Bank and Fraser Yachts have opined that finishing construction of the Vessel elsewhere would likely significantly reduce its value.

[46] I am satisfied that there is a reasonable possibility that the petitioners, working with Fraser Yachts, will be able to find a purchaser for the Vessel before April 13, 2012, or that alternatively they will be able to negotiate DIP financing and then proceed with construction. I find there remains a reasonable prospect that the petitioners will be able to present a plan of arrangement to their creditors. I am satisfied that it is their intention to do so. Accordingly, I find that circumstances do exist at this time that make the extension order appropriate.

### **Good faith and due diligence**

[47] Since the last extension order granted on September 19, 2011, the petitioners have acted diligently by completing the sale of the shipyard and thereby reducing their overheads; by proceeding with the marketing of the Vessel pursuant to orders of this Court and the Federal Court; and by embarking upon negotiations for possible DIP financing, all in furtherance of their restructuring.

[48] Notwithstanding the dispute between Mr. Barnett and Mr. Blane, which resulted in the commencement of litigation in the State of Florida at or about the same time this Court made its Initial Order in the *CCAA* proceedings, the petitioners have been able to take significant steps in the restructuring process, including the sale of the shipyard and leaseback of a portion of that facility, and the applications in both this Court and the Federal Court for orders for the marketing of the Vessel. The dispute between Mr. Barnett and his former partner, Mr. Blane has not prevented the petitioners from acting diligently in these proceedings. Nor am I persuaded on the evidence adduced on this application that dispute would preclude the petitioners from carrying on their business of designing and constructing custom yachts, in the event of a successful restructuring.

[49] While the allegations of misconduct, fraud and misappropriation of funds made by Mr. Barnett against Mr. Blane are serious, at this stage they are no more than allegations. They have not yet been adjudicated. The allegations, which are as yet unproven, do not involve dishonesty, bad faith, or fraud by the debtor companies in their dealings with stakeholders in the course of the *CCAA* process.

[50] In my view, the failure of the petitioners to disclose the dispute between Mr. Barnett and Mr. Blane does not constitute bad faith in the *CCAA* proceedings or warrant the exercise of the Court's discretion against an extension of the stay.

[51] This case is distinguishable from *Re San Francisco Gifts Ltd.*, where the debtor company had pleaded guilty to 9 counts of copyright infringement, and had received a large fine for doing so.

[52] In *Re San Francisco Gifts Ltd.*, at paras 30 to 32, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench acknowledged that a debtor company's business practices may be so offensive as to warrant refusal of a stay extension on public policy grounds. However, the court declined to do so where the debtor company was acting in good faith and with due diligence in working toward presenting a plan of arrangement to its creditors.

[53] The good faith requirement of s. 11.02(3) is concerned primarily with good faith by the debtor in the *CCAA* proceedings. I am satisfied that the petitioners have acted in good faith and with due diligence in these proceedings.

### **Conclusion**

[54] The petitioners have met the onus of establishing that circumstances exist that make the extension order appropriate and that they have acted and are acting in good faith and with due diligence. Accordingly, the extension of the Initial Order and stay to April 13, 2012 is granted on the terms pronounced on December 16, 2011.

“PEARLMAN J.”